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Demographic projections of age structure provide the best infor-
mation available on long-term future human resources and demand.
In current data fairly robust correlations between age structure and
GDP and GDP growth have been discovered. In this paper we use
these two facts and study the forecasting properties of demograph-
ically based models. Extending the forecasts to 2050 suggests that
due to fertility decreases poor countries of today will start to catch up
with developed economies in which the growth process will stagnate
due to the growth of the elderly population. That remains the case
whether or not indications of positive longevity eﬀects are taken into
account.
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11 Introduction
The question of how demographic change interacts with economic develop-
ment has been discussed in the social sciences since before the 18th century
and onwards. The mercantilist view was that a large population stimulates
economic growth. In the 19th century Malthus’ arguments had persuaded
most economists that population growth, due to decreasing returns, leads to
lower per capita income. During the 20th century, opinions were more mixed.
Neo-malthusians still argued that population growth is harmful. Keynesians,
on the other hand, could see population growth as a stimulus to investment
demand and, thus, to income growth (Perlman 1975). A third neutralist
view, gaining inﬂuence during the 1970s and 1980s, was that population
growth rates are not an inﬂuential factor behind variations in per capita
income growth.
During the last ten years, however, a certain convergence of views has
emerged. The new consensus is that population age structure, and not pop-
ulation size, is what matters for the level of per capita income. In addition,
more and more stress has been put on the fact that low mortality should
not be seen only as an outcome of economic development. Increasing life
expectancy also plays an important role in triggering economic growth.
At least three arguments underscore the importance of age structure for
per capita income. One is the savings argument. In countries with high
child-dependency rates, savings rates will be low and this may lead to low
productivity. This argument was ﬁrst put forward by Coale and Hoover
(1958). Subsequent research has largely corroborated their argument.1 Sec-
ond, a high dependency rate implies a low worker per capita ratio and this
should lead to a lower per capita income in a direct way by a pure account-
ing eﬀect. Using human capital theory, Anne Krueger (1968) elaborated
this argument. Janowitz (1973) and others have demonstrated the empiri-
cal relevance of Krueger’s argument.2 Third, as demonstrated by Lindh and
Malmberg (1999) age structure within the working-age population is also of
importance.
The argument for a life-expectancy eﬀect on economic development has
equally strong support. First, increasing life-expectancy is likely to increase
savings by increasing the risk for survival into old age dependency. Second,
higher life expectancy increases the expected return of education.3
1For a few examples see Leﬀ 1969; Mason 1987; Mason 1988; Kelley and Schmidt 1996.
2Bloom and Freeman (1986), Brander and Dowrick (1994), Malmberg (1994), Bloom
and Williamson (1997), Bloom and Sachs (1998), Bloom et al. (2000).
3De la Croix and Licandro (1999), Kalemli-Özcan et al. (2000), Zhang et al. (2001),
Boucekkine et al. (2002), Kalemli-Özcan (2002), Boucekkine et al. (2003), Kalemli-Özcan
2These arguments have important implications for long-term per capita
income forecasting. Historically, such forecasts have been based primarily
on assumptions about the rate of technological change. However, if–as sug-
gested in this literature–there exists a stable statistical relation between
on one hand, per capita income and, on the other hand, age structure and
life expectancy, then it should be possible to use conventional population
projections to forecast future trends in income growth.
An important question is the interpretation of such per capita income
forecasts. Here, diﬀerent views are possible. One interpretation is that the
income forecast only clariﬁes that population projections contain implicit
forecasts of future economic development. If increasing life expectancy his-
torically has been associated with increasing per capita income, then a pop-
ulation projection that assumes rising life expectancy implicitly assumes a
rising per capita income. The second possibility is that we believe that the
assumptions made in the population forecasts are based on trends in fertility
and mortality independent of income growth. In this case, the demograph-
ically based income forecasts become statements about the probable future
trends in per capita income caused by such demographic trends. A third op-
tion following from a causal interpretation is to treat such income forecasts
as policy models. Changes in fertility and mortality can often be inﬂuenced
by explicit policies. The HIV/AIDS epidemic, for example, might be suc-
cessfully contained by investing resources into health care and prevention.
In this case, demographically based income forecasts are tools for evaluating
the economic impact of population policies. Irrespective for which purpose
demographically based income forecasts are used, however, we need knowl-
edge about the stability of the forecasting model. The purpose of this paper
is, therefore, primarily to explore whether demographically based models can
deliver such stability and thus provide a valuable forecasting tool.
In the next section we ﬁrst discuss some obvious problems, and explain
our estimation strategy. In Section 3 we review our speciﬁcation search and
present out-of-sample tests. In Section 4 we discuss two alternative forecasts,
one simple homogeneous approach and one allowing for heterogeneity in ef-
fects contingent on the current level of life expectancy. In Section 5 ﬁnally
we conclude that our forecasts imply shifts in future economic power from
currently developed economies to economies where fertility is now on its way
down.
(2003), Zhang, Zhang et al. (2003).
32 Forecasting problems in focus
There are a number of problems to deal with in the basic speciﬁcation of a
robust regression equation of GDP on demographic variables. First, it must
be noted that demographic projections, of course, are uncertain. To a ﬁrst-
order approximation this is a question of the assumptions made on fertility,
migration and mortality in the demographic projections. Probabilistic de-
mographic forecasts could be plugged into the model to deal with this issue
in an explicit way (see e.g. Prskawetz et al. 2005 in this issue). Here we
abstract from that problem, however.
In focus for this paper is the problem of model heterogeneity both across
countries and over time. This is a common worry when working with cross-
country panels (Ul Haque et al. 1999). Is it legitimate to assume a homoge-
neous model for such a variety of countries, diﬀerent in size, location, history,
institutions and natural resources? In some sense, every country is a unique
economic system related to its neighbours by a multitude of diﬀerent rela-
tions. There are countries like Singapore, which cannot really be modelled as
a closed independent national economy. There are vast diﬀerences between
a country like Sweden and a country like Zaïre which would seem to inval-
idate any comparison. In the extreme one might even consider individual
models for every country. That would, however, not be an eﬃcient use of the
available information, not to mention that there are a substantial number of
countries where our information is scant or of questionable quality.
Using a panel estimation approach confers substantial advantages. Not
only do our number of observations increase substantially, but it also allows
us to control for unobservables that are constant over the estimation period
as well as common time-speciﬁce ﬀects. The price to be paid for this is that
we need to assume that a more or less general model applies to all countries
in the sample. It is, however, neither inconceivable nor impossible to account
for some country diﬀerences within the model.
Structural breaks in the data are in a sense the corresponding problem of
heterogeneity in the model across time. Some events liable to cause structural
breaks or model shifts may be worldwide inﬂuences like oil crises, that we can
control for by time-speciﬁce ﬀects, some of more regional importance as the
opening of free markets within the EU are harder, some only aﬀecting speciﬁc
countries like the genocide in Rwanda may be controlled for by dummies.
Others like the breakdown of the Bretton-Woods system are likely to have
much more long-lasting regime changing eﬀects, and still others may have
important spin-oﬀ eﬀects on neighbouring countries.
There are also some diﬃculties at the global scale that we wish to draw
attention to. We start from the assumption that our cross-country obser-
4vations are drawn from a data generating process that is at least partly
common to all countries, viz. the demographic transition and the concurrent
industrialization and aging of the population. However, our observations are
drawn only from a limited period of this transition for each country. Some
countries are just in the beginning of this process while others are enter-
ing a second transition into an ageing society. While the observations from
more developed countries provide information to forecast (to some extent at
least) the evolution of the less developed countries, our sample contains little
information regarding the ageing society and how it will adapt to a rising
dependency burden.
Finally, a standard problem of time series analysis should be mentioned.
Regression of non-stationary series on each other can cause spurious regres-
sion. However, recent work demonstrates that this problem is substantially
ameliorated in a panel context by the cross-section information (Phillips and
Moon 1999). Österholm 2005 in this issue also demonstrates that GDP and
age structure are likely to be cointegrated in an OECD sample. Moreover,
our out-of-sample tests below indirectly probe also this issue, since a spurious
regression cannot generate reasonable out-of-sample forecasts.
T h e r ei sa l w a y sat r a d e - o ﬀ of drawbacks and advantages in diﬀerent ap-
proaches to forecasting. Our target is to devise a forecasting model that only
relies on variables which can be independently projected. First of all, this
makes structural modelling less interesting since in the end we will have to
rely on a reduced model anyhow. Second, degrees of freedom are limited in
spite of using annual data on a world panel and overﬁtting can easily be-
come a problem. This is so primarily because we are attempting to estimate
low frequency long-run correlations, and thus in practice need very long pe-
riod data. Moreover, adding to the problem, the demographic variables are
rather collinear, limiting the number of variables for which regression coef-
ﬁcients can be identiﬁed. Third, since we are not interested in tracing all
the ups and downs of GDP per capita in detail or ﬁn d i n gam o d e lt h a tﬁts
all countries, we have to accept that some country observations will deviate
considerably from model predictions.
3S p e c i ﬁcation of model
We start with a model for a panel regression in levels of the logarithm of per
capita GDP, y, on the logarithms of age shares, a, a n dat r e n df u n c t i o nh(t),






Thus we assume for starters that GDP per capita can be described by a Cobb-
Douglas index of age shares and an exponential trend function intended to
capture technological change. This is essentially a standard production func-
tion speciﬁcation although we use population shares as substitutes for pro-
duction factor intensities. We allow for country-speciﬁc intercepts through
ηi. The logarithmic form ameliorates problems with heteroskedasticity and
also makes it possible to include the whole distribution of age shares in the
ﬁxed eﬀect estimation.4
Based on previous work (Lindh and Malmberg, 1999) an aggregation of
age groups to children 0-14, young adults 15-29, mature adults 30-49, middle
aged 50-64, and old age 65+ is known to work well in growth equations
for the OECD without running into collinearity problems. This corresponds
roughly to the age intervals in which humans are ﬁrst dependent on parents,
second ﬁnding their place in adult life and forming a family, third raising
their family, fourth preparing for retirement and ﬁfth retiring. The limits for
these functional groups are, of course, not exact. They vary both with time
and culture, as well as the institutions that transmit and govern the economic
eﬀects of each age group. Nor do we expect eﬀects to be uniform within the
limits. This speciﬁcation is thus a pragmatic approximation for estimating
growth eﬀects from the continuous age distribution. The age distribution in
turn proxies for the actual functional changes over the life cycle which are
t h er e a lc a u s e sf o rt h ei n c o m ee ﬀects.
We use a sample of 111 countries with GDP data in the Penn data base
(Heston et al. 2002) at least 1961-1996 and in some cases for the full period
1950-1998. Demographic variables are from UN World Population Prospects
(2000). More details are in the appendices.
Plotting the log of GDP per capita for all the time series in Figure 1
it becomes apparent that although most of the individual country series are
trended, a common linear trend is not obviously present, nor any convergence.
Most of the series also seem far too smooth to be generated by a common
stochastic trend (with asymptotically inﬁnite variance). The smoothness also
indicates a high degree of autocorrelation and persistence in the series.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: All 111 log GDP per capita time series plotted in one graph.
Source: Penn World Tables 6.1. To interpret the scale note that 6 correponds
approximately to $400 1996 USD and 10 to $22 000.
73.1 Speciﬁcation tests
In this sub-section we review some variations of the basic speciﬁcation of
the homogeneous model. First, in Table 1 we present a pooled model in
column 1. Results reported in the table are for the unbalanced sample with
standard errors adjusted for that. Using just a linear trend signiﬁcant non-
linear trends appeared in the residuals. The quadratic trend got rid of these
anomalies. In spite of the quadratic trend the residual tests indicate that we
still have some unaccounted time-speciﬁce ﬀects as well as strong country-
speciﬁce ﬀects. The next two columns compare a ﬁxed and random eﬀects
speciﬁcation of country-speciﬁce ﬀects. The serial correlation of errors is
highly signiﬁcant indicating that omitted variables bias may be present, so
in the last two columns of the table we compare speciﬁcations with country-
speciﬁce ﬀects including lagged dependent variables. The long-run factors
implied are large, however, and the precision of age coeﬃcients compromised.
The eﬃciency gain from using random eﬀects seems to be very small or
non-existent and we conclude that the simpler and more robust ﬁxed eﬀects
estimator is preferable.5
The age coeﬃcients do show the hump-shape over the life cycle–at least
when we control for country-speciﬁce ﬀects–that we would expect making us
conﬁdent that we are on the right track. The quadratic trend (with maxima
around 1980) is, however disturbing, since projecting such a strong downward
trend forward indicates negative GDP per capita for several countries in 2050.
Although the Ljung-Box Q-test is not fully appropriate in this context it
gives some indication of the strength of the auto-correlation in the residuals
which is monotonously tapering oﬀ, indicating that an AR(1) model for the
residuals might be an alternative to the lag model. However, scrutinizing the
individual country residuals it becomes very obvious that the autocorrelation
is far from similar over countries and thus ﬁtting a common autoregressive
errors model will be misleading. On the other hand country-speciﬁcA R
models are likely to be overﬁtting the data.
The ﬁrst lag coeﬃcient is close to unity suggesting that the hypothesis
of a unit root in GDP/capita cannot be dismissed directly. As noted above
we do not consider the risk of spurious regression to be very high. To have a
further check we nevertheless estimated an ECM model (not reported) which
could not reject that GDP and the age variables are cointegrated. Testing
the stationarity of the residuals we, furthermore, found no evidence of non-
stationary behavior apart from autocorrelation. The experiment reassured us
5We do not rely on a formal Hausman test because both in the omitted variables
case and when using lags the ﬁxed eﬀect model cannot be guaranteed to yield consistent
estimates, which is necessary for the validity of this test.
8Dep var OLS Country eﬀects Including lags
log(GDP/cap) Fixed Random Fixed Random
Constant 10.40 5.941 0.388
(0.96) (0.34) (0.10)
loga0−14 -1.399 -1.691 -1.684 -0.057 -0.021
(0.24) (0.08) (0.08) (0.03) (0.02)
loga15−29 0.952 -0.202 -0.199 0.004 0.015
(0.21) (0.06) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02)
loga30−49 1.102 0.153 0.158 0.045 0.045
(0.22) (0.07) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02)
loga50−64 -1.110 0.146 0.159 0.019 0.022
(0.20) (0.05) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01)
loga65+ 1.205 -0.077 -0.057 -0.0086 0.009
(0.11) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
Trend T ∗ 10 0.39 0.47 0.47 0.024 0.014
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.004) (0.004)
T2 ∗ 1000 -0.72 -0.66 -0.66 -0.04 -0.03
(0.10) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)





long run factor 20.9 34.3
¯ R2 0.672 0.959 0.960 0.997 0.997
F time eﬀects 2.27 2.55 2.55 3.92 3.91
F country eﬀ 185.1 —— ——
Ljung-Box Q(6) 23202 13955 13979 7.57 9.25
Table 1: Bold face indicates that the estimates or residual tests are signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent from zero on the 5 percent level. In parentheses Newey-West
robust standard errors allowing for three lags are reported for the pooled
model. Standard errors in parentheses for the panel models are adjusted for
the unbalanced panel.
9that the statistical problems of spurious regression with random coeﬃcients,
diverging t-ratios and so on, are indeed highly unlikely.
The residuals of the models in Table 1 exhibit rather strong non-normality,
mainly due to high kurtosis in the distribution of the errors of the models
allowing for country-speciﬁc intercepts. The question then is whether it is
meaningful to pursue a common homogeneous model or turn to an attempt
to model some of the country heterogeneity.
Including time-speciﬁce ﬀects instead of trends stabilizes the age coef-
ﬁcient estimates somewhat (not reported here). The fat error distribution
tails may raise a suspicion of structural breaks that may distort both de-
terministic and stochastic trend estimates. Recursive coeﬃcient estimates
revealed that the coeﬃcients remain unstable until we start to include data
from the 1990s, perhaps strengthening that suspicion. On the other hand the
low frequency variation in the variables suggests that it may be unreasonable
to expect stable estimates from too short time series dimensions.
3.2 Life expectancy and heterogeneity
Summing up what we learned from the speciﬁcation search the quadratic
trend cannot be used for forecasting so we need to ﬁnd some other way
to account for this trend in the data. Time-speciﬁce ﬀe c t si so n eo b v i o u s
remedy. Moreover, we need to devise some practical way of accounting for
heterogeneity without getting stuck with parameter estimates that are hard
to project forward.
The relationship between income and demographic variables is likely to
shift over time and stage of development since life cycles and institutions
are adapting to new conditions. There are numerous reasons why we should
expect the coeﬃcients of age shares to vary over time and countries, for one
important example consider length of education. This variable in turn is de-
pendent on expected returns which are partly determined by life expectancy.
Therefore, interacting the age shares with life expectancy at birth, e0,c o u l d
correct for some of the heterogeneity across countries that depends on stage
of development. Partly this may also capture something of the trend of
technological change (or more correctly the Solow residual measuring our ig-
norance of this factor). If so, this allows us to skip the undesirable quadratic
trend in the speciﬁcation and substitute life expectancy at birth, a country-
and time-dependent variable, for this mechanical variable and also expect to
catch some of the country heterogeneity in coeﬃcients by interaction terms.
Thus we specify a purely demographic model that allows for some systematic
10country heterogeneity.
yit = αloge0it +
65+ X
k=0−14
(βk + γk loge0it)akit + ηi + νt + εit (2)
In theory this allows for changing age share coeﬃcients contingent on how
far the demographic transition has progressed. We have also added νt to
account for time-speciﬁce ﬀects. A potential problem is that life expectancy
is highly correlated with age structure, especially the size of older groups,
and more seriously with the interaction terms themselves. However, checking
the correlation matrix it turns out that log life expectancy is more strongly
correlated (about 0.8) with log GDP per capita than with any of the age
share variables. Although there are some elements in the correlation matrix
above 0.9, these mainly involve children and the above 50 age groups, which
all have rather trend-like movements. This might lead to some distortions
of the coeﬃcients for these groups, but as is clear from below, the models
are rather stable in spite of this, given that the time series dimension is long
enough.
3.3 Parameter estimates of heterogeneous model
To simplify later out-of-sample tests and forecasts, we only use data up to
1996 from this point on. Table 2 presents the results obtained by estimating
the model in eq. 2, in the ﬁrst column without the interaction terms. The
second and third column report the interaction regression, direct age eﬀects
in the second column, and coeﬃcients for the interaction with loge0 in the
third column.
The estimates show that life expectancy is positively correlated with per
capita income. The estimates of interaction eﬀects also indicate that the basic
h y p o t h e s i si sv a l i d ;l i f ee x p e c t a n c ym o d i ﬁes the correlation with demographic
structure by shifting life phases. Of course, these estimates also imply that a
substantial impact of life expectancy is through the interaction with the age
share variables.
In Figure 2 we visualize this shifting pattern of age elasticities on income
that are implied by the heterogeneous model (without outlier corrections).
The eﬀect of young and mature adults decreases with life expectancy while
t h en e g a t i v ee ﬀects of dependents tend to decrease also. This shifts the hump
of the life cycle pattern upwards and makes it ﬂatter and less pronounced as
life expectancy rise. This might indicate that increasing length of education
in low mortality populations reduces positive eﬀects from young adults while
increasing them for middle aged and even perhaps for the elderly. The latter
11Dependent var. Simple model Heterogeneous model, interaction loge0
log(GDP/cap) without interaction with interaction incl. outlier corr.
γk =0 α, βk γk α, βk γk
loge0 0.312 5.412 14.593
(0.07) (2.38) (2.13)
loga0−14 -1.850 -5.45 1.062 -11.001 2.429
(0.09) (3.01) (0.69) (2.67) (0.61)
loga15−29 -0.249 3.704 -0.872 0.677 -0.122
(0.07) (2.25) (0.52) (1.98) (0.46)
loga30−49 0.013 3.800 -0.831 -3.759 0.937
(0.07) (1.79) (0.42) (1.59) (0.37)
loga50−64 0.135 0.251 0.017 -0.891 0.289
(0.05) (1.02) (0.24) (0.91) (0.22)
loga65+ -0.078 -7.597 1.873 -11.151 2.761
(0.04) (0.65) (0.16) (0.61) (0.15)
¯ R2 0.961 0.964 0.973
Skewness -0.110 -0.097 -0.017
p-value 0.002 0.007 0.630
Kurtosis 0.777 0.938 0.219
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.002
Jarque-Bera 127.8 179.8 9.637
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.008
Table 2: Elasticity estimates of demographic structure and life expectancy
on log per capita GDP. Heterogeneous interaction model in eq. (2) with ﬁxed
time and country eﬀects. Bold face indicates that the estimates or tests are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero on the 5 percent level. Standard errors in
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Figure 2: The pattern of shifting age elasticities from the heterogeneous
model without outlier corrections in Table 2.
13conclusion is highly uncertain due to the collinearity issue between children
and elderly although it is an intriguing possibility that we actually catch a
trend in that direction.
The attempt to control for country-speciﬁc periods, e.g. associated with
civil wars and other extreme events, as well as some country-speciﬁct r e n d s
did not entirely succeed in getting the residuals normally distributed, see
columns 4 and 5 and the Jarque-Bera tests for normally distributed residu-
als. We also report tests for signiﬁcant skewness and kurtosis to show that
kurtosis is the main cause for the failure of the normality tests. The general
age pattern is similar in the outlier-corrected version, with the exception that
30-49 years old tend to have negative eﬀects (although still positive relative
to dependents). It is, however, hard to assess whether this has to do with
the tinkering of the model or is a real phenomenon, and since it does not
substantially aﬀect forecasts, we leave it as a puzzle for future research.
One way to summarize these ﬁndings is to note that at low and medium
levels of life expectancy the age eﬀects on per capita income are dominated
by the balance between children and young adults.6 Child-rich populations
tend to be poor whereas countries with declining child dependency and an
expanding young adult population enjoy rising per capita income. At higher
levels of life expectancy it is instead a high share of middle age adults (30-49
and 50-64 years old) that ensure good economic prospects. Although the
age patterns clearly shift with life expectancy it should be noted that the
direct elasticities in the model without interactions are, if we take account
of diﬀerent intercepts rather close to an average of the patterns observed
contingent on life expectancy.
3.4 Out-of-sample tests
I nT a b l e3w ec o m p a r et h eo u t - o f - s a m p l ee r r o r so ft h es i m p l eh o m o g e n e o u s
age model in the ﬁrst column of Table 2 and the interaction model without
outliers (in the next two columns of Table 2) with two simple test models.
We take cross-section means of forecast errors using data recursively 1980
up to 1996 and average over the observations available for x step forward
forecasts. An add-in factor has been used in the forecasts in order to have
the same value in the last sample year as in the forecast. A rationalisation
of this common procedure is available in e.g. Hendry and Clements (1998).
To check whether the results are driven only by high autocorrelation in time
series we estimated a pure lag model with three lags included and one naive
6It might be worth mentioning that examining a scatter plot of life expectancy against
GDP per capita, it is evident that the correlation between the two variables becomes
substantially stronger and more positive only when life expectancy climbs above 50 years.
14steps # obs me mae me mae
ahead Simple model Pure lag model
1 17 -0.004 0.040 0.020 0.055
2 17 -0.008 0.064 0.037 0.084
3 16 -0.012 0.083 0.054 0.113
4 15 -0.014 0.100 0.072 0.141
5 14 -0.017 0.113 0.087 0.165
6 13 -0.020 0.127 0.104 0.189
7 12 -0.023 0.140 0.119 0.212
8 11 -0.025 0.154 0.136 0.236
9 10 -0.029 0.166 0.151 0.259
10 9 -0.032 0.179 0.166 0.282
Interaction model Naive model
1 17 -0.006 0.040 0.008 0.042
2 17 -0.011 0.065 0.015 0.069
3 16 -0.017 0.084 0.023 0.092
4 15 -0.021 0.101 0.031 0.112
5 14 -0.026 0.116 0.039 0.129
6 13 -0.030 0.130 0.047 0.146
7 12 -0.035 0.144 0.055 0.164
8 11 -0.039 0.159 0.063 0.182
9 10 -0.044 0.172 0.071 0.198
10 9 -0.049 0.186 0.078 0.214
Table 3: Dynamic forecast over the horizon 1980-1996 using two demographic
models from Table 2 and a lag model and a naive (random walk) model
for comparison. Negative mean errors (me) indicate over-shooting, positive
under-shooting. Mean absolute errors (mae) are also reported. The models
have been re-estimated and forecasts for diﬀerent steps cumulated. The
means have been taken over the sample countries and then over the number
of observations available of diﬀerent steps ahead forecasts.
15random walk model with forecast ˆ yi,t+k = yit.We tested (but do not report)
the model with outlier corrections since this does not improve on the other
two models.
Both the demographic models forecast better than the comparison mod-
e l s . A n dw es h o u l dk e e pi nm i n dt h a t ,a sn o t e da b o v e ,t h ec o e ﬃcient es-
timates do not become stable until we use data up to the 1990s. Starting
with data only up to 1980 thus puts these models at a disadvantage. To test
reasonably long forecast horizons out-of-sample we have, however, no choice
but to use these estimates in spite of the instability. The non-demographic
models have a tendency towards a positive mean error yit − ˆ yit while the de-
mographic models tend to have negative mean errors indicating a tendency
to overshoot actual outcomes in this period, 1980-1996. It bears emphasiz-
ing that in this context of very long-run forecasts of income trends the mean
error is actually more relevant than the mean absolute errors since the latter
measures the variation around the trend. In a sense, we estimate and forecast
potential GDP rather than actual GDP (see Lindh 2004 for a demonstration
of this). Thus we do not really want to penalize business cycle deviations
but rather trade oﬀ them as in the mean error measure. That is, of course,
even more the case with the root mean square error that penalizes large
deviations, as in cases of war outbreaks, even more.7
Some experiments with including lags in the homogeneous demographic
model showed that the overshooting tendency could be reversed and even
better mean errors achieved over this period. However, the models including
lags estimate age share coeﬃcients very imprecisely. This leads to some
strange forecasting behavior on the even longer horizons we are aiming for.
Hence, including lags for forecasts on 10 year horizons would be recommended
but not for very long-term forecasts.
The conclusion is that although heterogeneity in the age eﬀects seems
to be clearly present, the diﬃculties in getting reliable estimates of twice
the number of parameters for highly collinear variables are dominating our
out-of-sample tests. However, forecasts for the next century may still be
more plausible if taking account of this heterogeneity. One important reason
being, as noted above, that we really do not know how ageing societies will
adapt, for example by longer work lives. The heterogeneous model as seen
in Figure 2 actually seems to catch such a tendency. In the next section we
therefore proceed to compare the long-term forecasts up to 2050 from the
homogeneous age model with those of the interaction model.
7Anyway the root mean square error may not be very reliable for judging accuracy as
Armstrong and Collopy (1992) argue, especially in a situation where we do not want to
give outliers caused by wars or other extreme events undue weights.
163.5 Forecasts up to 2050
Below the 1997-2050 forecasts per capita income in diﬀerent countries are
discussed. These forecasts are all based on the medium variant of World
Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision. The fertility assumptions applied
by the Population Division in the medium variant are reproduced in appen-
dix A. According to the Population Division mortality in the medium version
is projected on the basis of the models of change of life expectancy produced
by the United Nations. In countries highly aﬀected by the HIV/AIDS epi-
demic, estimates of the impact of the disease are made explicitly through
assumptions about the future course of the epidemic, that is, by projecting
the yearly incidence of HIV infection. The parameter values used in the
forecasts are those that are presented in Table 2.
Besides the diﬃculties in presenting 111 separate country forecasts it
is also important to recall that the forecasts are based on average models
that cannot be expected to ﬁt all countries equally well. In Table 4 we
present some summary statistics comparing actually observed growth rates
up to 1998 with the projected growth rates up to 2050 for the two mod-
els: the simple homogeneous model and the heterogeneous model with life
expectancy interaction. To further emphasize that the models predict stag-
nation for a number of countries in terms of decreasing mean growth rates
and convergence for some others in terms of increasing mean growth rates
we have subdivided the sample along these lines. From this table it is clear
that, as expected, the interaction model is the more optimistic one predict-
ing overall higher growth rates and less stagnating countries. The diﬀerences
are, however, surprisingly small and only ten countries shift groups and only
from stagnating to converging countries. The countries in the samples are
reported in the Appendix.Table 5 where it is also noted whether forecasts
are implying increasing or decreasing growth It is clear that the division of
countries here is overall consistent with the generalization that currently de-
veloped countries will stagnate and currently less developed countries will
converge to the growth economies.
The general pattern that developed countries will tend to stagnate while
developing countries will tend to take oﬀ on a growth path holds also if we
attempt to include lags in the forecast model. The exceptions are mainly in
Sub-Saharan Africa and due to the AIDS epidemic, but even there we predict
at a k e - o ﬀ eventually.
In Figure 3 we see the implications of the forecasts in terms of changes
in the cross-country rank distribution of GDP per capita. The simple model
implies a more equal distribution in 2050 than the interaction model. The
generally more optimistic forecasts from the interaction model are even more
17Obs Mean Std Error Minimum Maximum
All 111 countries: growth statistics
Observed 20th century 4849 0.017 0.061 -0.487 0.438
Simple model 21st century 5994 0.018 0.014 -0.032 0.096
Interaction 21st century 5994 0.023 0.014 -0.076 0.108
Simple model: emerging 62 countries
Observed 20th century 2628 0.006 0.068 -0.487 0.438
Simple model 21st century 3348 0.021 0.012 -0.016 0.059
Simple model: stagnating 49 countries
Observed 20th century 2221 0.030 0.050 -0.301 0.335
Simple model 21st century 2646 0.015 0.017 -0.032 0.096
Interaction model: emerging 72 countries
Observed 20th century 3076 0.009 0.067 -0.487 0.438
Interaction 21st century 3888 0.025 0.013 -0.039 0.108
Interaction model: stagnating 39 countries
Observed 20th century 1773 0.032 0.047 -0.301 0.335
Interaction 21st century 2106 0.020 0.014 -0.076 0.068
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for growth rates, old and projected, in diﬀerent
samples, where emerging denote that the projected growth rates are higher
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Figure 3: The rank distribution of income in 1996 US dollars in 2050 com-
pared to 1996 for the simple model and the interaction model.
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Figure 4: Predicted GPD per capita in 1996 US dollars compared with actual
postwar development. Dashed lines are forecasts from the interaction model,
whole lines actual data and forecasts from the simple model.
optimistic for the higher percentiles, which are, of course still the countries
that are highly developed economically today. Recomputing growth rates
p e rc a p i t ai nt e r m so fw o r l dG D Pg r o w t ht h es i m p l em o d e li m p l ya na v e r a g e
2.1 percent annual growth 1997-2050 while the interaction model implies 2.8
percent annual growth.
In Figure 4 some typical examples of GDP forecasts for developed coun-
tries are shown and compared to the largest Latin American economy. The
simple model loads ageing negatively while the interaction model predicts
continued but stagnating growth. In Sweden due to its recent baby boom
around 1990 the simple model predicts very fast growth over the next two
decades while the US stagnates earlier and Japan already has stagnated. The
interaction model which loads increased longevity positively has a much more
positive path but still stagnating in the long run. Note that the scales are
diﬀerent for diﬀerent countries.
In Figure 5 some examples of less developed economies are shown. In In-
dia and China the diﬀerence between the two forecasts have a similar pattern
as for the US although at lower levels and the simple model stagnates later in
China and later still in India. For Senegal as for most of Sub-Saharan Africa
there is practically no diﬀerence between the forecasts from the two models.
South Africa on the other hand shows the typical pattern for HIV stricken
countries where the interaction model shows a less favorable path due to the
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Figure 5: Predicted GPD per capita in 1996 US dollars compared with actual
postwar development. Dashed lines are forecasts from the interaction model,
whole lines actual data and forecasts from the simple model.
AIDS impact on longevity, but as the UN predicts that the epidemic comes
under control growth becomes very fast.
These few examples of the country forecasts must suﬃce to give a general
impression of the tendencies implied by the forecasts.
4 Conclusions
Using demographic projections we evaluate forecasting models for GDP per
capita based on demographic information. The out-of-sample experiments
are satisfactory but cannot give us more than a clue to the long-term relia-
bility, since we have too few observations to be able to evaluate 50 years ahead
However, the pattern of growth rates generated are by and large reasonable
and lies well inside the numbers observed over the 20th century. Still, the
out-of-sample tests indicate that there may be a certain over-shooting ten-
dency in the forecasts.
When we allow for heterogeneity by interaction with life expectancy that
generates a shifting age pattern forecasts in general becomes more optimistic
and especially for the developed part of the world. The picture emerging
from both a homogeneous age structure model and a heterogenous interac-
tion model is, however, similar in its general trends. The currently aging
21developed countries will experience a stagnating or even negative growth
trend in GDP. Most developing countries will, however, experience accel-
erating growth and converge to although not reach the income levels of the
developed world. The main exceptions to this are to be found in sub-Saharan
Africa where the impact of AIDS on the age distribution postpone any growth
take-oﬀ. However, even in these countries the UN assumptions that the AIDS
epidemic will be brought to an end results in increasing growth rates towards
the end of the period.
Thus we expect that demographic chan g ea n dt h ed e m o g r a p h i cg i f tf o l -
lowing from decreased fertility rates will substantially decrease the share of
people living in extreme poverty in the world. The negative aging eﬀects on
developed countries do not imply any catastrophic decrease of living stan-
dards although there may be some stagnation and even decrease. The futures
scenario that appears from this forecasting exercise is thus a rather bright
one, where economic prosperity increases and fewer people will live in ex-
treme poverty.
The reliability and validity of our forecasts, of course, must be subjected
to further tests and studies. There are, however, at least three circumstances
pointing in the direction that the method compares favorably to any alter-
natives. First, demographic structure is the most fundamental determinant
of human resources that we can easily measure. Second, this structure can
be reliably (in a relative sense) projected for a long period of time thanks to
the inertia inherent in demographic momentum. Third, although our point
forecasts for individual countries in 2050 are highly uncertain, the statistical
patterns generated seem reasonable enough with world growth rates between
2 and 3 percent annually.
There are still, of course, a number of unsolved problems to investigate
closer. One of the more interesting directions to go is an integration with
stochastic demographic projections in order to achieve better estimates of
the uncertainty of these forecasts.
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A Fertility assumptions
The medium variant of World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision
Fertility assumptions are described in terms of the following groups of
countries:
1. High-fertility countries: Countries that until 2000 have had no fer-
tility reduction or only an incipient decline;
2. Medium-fertility countries: Countries where fertility has been declin-
ing but whose level is still above replacement level (2.1 children per woman);
3. Low-fertility countries: Those countries with fertility at or below
replacement level (2.1 children per woman) plus a few with levels very close
to replacement levels that are expected to fall below replacement level in the
near future.
Medium-fertility assumptions:
1. Fertility in high-fertility countries is generally assumed to decline
at an average pace of nearly one child per decade starting in 2005 or later.
Consequently, some of these countries do not reach replacement level by 2050.
2. Fertility in medium-fertility countries is assumed to reach replace-
ment level before 2050.
3. Fertility in low-fertility countries is generally assumed to remain
below replacement level during most of the projection period, reaching by
2045-2050 the fertility of the cohort of women born in the early 1960s or,
if that information is lacking, reaching 1.7 children per woman if current
fertility is below 1.5 children per woman or 1.9 children per woman if current
fertility is equal to or higher than 1.5 children per woman.
25BD a t a
Our economic data are taken from Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina
Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.1, Center for International Comparisons
at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), October 2002. The data were
downloaded that same year We ﬁrst used the 111 countries which had coher-
ent data for at least the period 1961-1996 using the variable RGDPCH (the
chain indexed PPP-adjusted real GDP estimate) which is available for many
countries since 1950. The RGDPCH series for Haiti only stretched back to
1967 but the Laspeyres indexed RGDPL was available 1960-1965 so we in-
terpolated for 1966 and linked using the ratio RGDPL and RGDPCH after
1967.We deleted countries with shorter time series both because we wanted
to maintain a reasonably balanced panel and because we know from time
series estimation that too short time series are unreliable when estimating
the correlations to age structure. The resulting list of 111 countries are in
Table 5. We only report regressions on that sample in order to enhance com-
parability. In the table we report the period for which we have data, and also
whether the country belonged to the converging sample with higher growth
rates in the projections: two asterisks if that is the case in both models, one
asterisk if it is only in the interaction model.
26Africa Tanzania** 60-98 Malaysia 54-98
Algeria** 60-98 Togo** 60-98 Nepal** 60-98
Angola** 60-96 Tunisia* 61-98 New Zealand* 50-97
Benin** 59-98 Uganda** 50-98 Pakistan** 50-98
Botswana** 60-98 Zambia** 55-98 Papua New Guinea** 60-98
Burkina Faso** 59-98 Zimbabwe** 54-98 Philippines** 50-98
Burundi** 60-98 Europe Singapore 60-98
Cameroon** 60-98 Austria 50-98 Sri Lanka* 50-98
Cape Verde* 60-98 Belgium 50-98 Syria* 60-98
Centr. Afr. Rep.** 60-98 Cyprus 50-96 Thailand 50-98
Chad** 60-98 Denmark 50-98 Turkey 50-98
Comoros** 60-98 Finland 50-98 America
Congo** 60-98 France 50-98 Argentina** 50-98
Congo, Zaïre** 50-97 Greece 51-98 Barbados 60-96
Cote d’Ivoire** 60-98 Iceland 50-98 Bolivia** 50-98
Egypt** 50-98 Ireland 50-98 Brazil 50-98
Equatorial Guinea** 60-96 Italy 50-98 Canada 50-98
Ethiopia** 50-98 Luxembourg 50-98 Chile 51-98
Gabon 60-98 Netherlands 50-98 Colombia** 50-98
Gambia** 60-98 Norway 50-98 Costa Rica** 50-98
Ghana** 55-98 Portugal 50-97 Dominican Republic 51-98
Guinea** 59-98 Romania 60-98 Ecuador** 51-98
Guinea-Bissau** 60-98 Spain 50-98 El Salvador** 50-98
Kenya** 50-98 Sweden 51-98 Guatemala** 50-98
Lesotho 60-98 Switzerland 50-98 Guyana** 50-98
Madagascar** 60-98 United Kingdom 50-98 Haiti** 60-98
Malawi** 54-98 Asia & Oceania Honduras** 50-98
Mali** 60-98 Australia 50-98 Jamaica** 53-98
Mauritania** 60-98 Bangladesh** 59-98 Mexico** 50-98
Mauritius* 50-98 China 52-98 Nicaragua** 50-98
Morocco** 50-98 Fiji** 60-96 Panama* 50-98
Mozambique** 60-98 Hong Kong 60-98 Paraguay** 51-98
Namibia** 60-98 India* 50-98 Peru** 50-98
Niger** 60-98 Indonesia 60-98 Trinidad & Tobago* 50-98
Nigeria** 50-98 Iran** 55-98 USA 50-98
Rwanda** 60-98 Israel 50-98 Uruguay* 50-98
Senegal** 60-98 Japan 50-98 Venezuela** 50-98
Sierra Leone** 61-96 Jordan** 54-98
South Africa** 50-98 Korea, Republic of 53-98
Table 5: The ﬁnal sample comprise these 111 countries, 44 in Africa, 19
in Europe, 23 in Asia & Oceania and 25 in America with the observation
p e r i o d sw eh a v ei no u rd a t a .T w os t a r sm a r kc o u n t r i e st h a tb o t ht h es i m p l e
demographic and the interaction model predict will grow faster over the
forecast period than they did over the observation period. One star marks
countries that will grow faster only according to the interaction model.
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